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THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE:
BIGELOW v. VIRGINIA
In Bigelow v. Virginia,' the United States Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional, as applied to a newspaper editor, a Virginia statute
that made it a misdemeanor to advertise for abortions. 2 It held an
abortion advertisement to be protected first amendment speech since it
contained "factual material of clear 'public interest'."' 3 Although
Bigelow referred to, and applied, the "commercial speech" doctrine,
the opinion is disappointing because it failed to establish long-awaited
guidelines for this "large gray area' 4 of the first amendment.
Appellant Bigelow was director, editor and responsible officer of The
Virginia Weekly. 5 After printing an advertisement for an abortion refer-
ral service,6 Bigelow was charged with violating a Virginia statute that
1. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
2. Act of March 30, 1960, ch. 358, § 18.1-63, [1960] Va. Acts 428 (repealed by
amendment 1972).
3. 421 U.S. at 822.
4. Kaufman, The Medium, The Message, and The First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 761, 769 (1970).
5. There is some disagreement as to whether this was an "underground newspaper."
As the Court notes, 421 U.S. at 811 n.1, appellant's brief describes it as such. Brief for
Appellant at 3, Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Presumably an editor of an
underground newspaper exercises more editorial discretion in the acceptance of adver-
tisements than an "above ground" editor. The underground editor endorses most pro-
ducts that are advertised since the paper is small-scale and a vehicle for his personal views.
To restrict the kind of products or services he can advertise is more of an infringement of
his freedom of expression than in the case of a large metropolitan daily.
6. The text of the advertisement was the following:
UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW COST
Contact
WOMEN'S PAVILION
515 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
or call anytime
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK
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prohibited publications from encouraging or prompting the procure-
ment of an abortion.7 His conviction and fine8 were affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Virginia. 9 While his appeal to the Supreme Court was
pending, Roe v. Wade ° and Doe v. Bolton" were decided. The Court
remanded for further consideration in light of these two landmark
cases,12 but the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Bigelow's conviction 3
distinguishing the performance of an abortion from advertising a com-
mercial abortion agency.14 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, 15 holding the statute an unconstitutional infringement of
Bigelow's first amendment rights.
Extensive Supreme Court analysis of first amendment rights began
with the "clear and present danger" cases of the World War I era. 16
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make
all arrangements for you and help you
with information and counseling.
421 U.S. at 812.
The federal government prohibits abortion advertising in interstate commerce. 18
U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). Abortion advertising is also "nonmailable" under the federal
obscenity statute. 39 U.S.C. § 3001(a) (1970). Two federal courts, however, have declared
the statute unconstitutional. Comprehensive Family Planning & Therapeutic Abortion
Ass'n v. Mitchell, Civ. No. 71-725 (W.D. Okla. 1973), reported in 2 FAM. PLANNINO
POPULATION REP. 86 (1973); Atlanta Cooperative News Project v. United States Postal
Serv., 350 F. Supp. 234 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
7. The statute at that time read, "If any person by publication, or by sale or
circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, encourages or prompts the
procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Act of March
30, 1960, ch. 358, § 18.1-63 [1960] Va. Acts 428. The statute was amended after the original
prosecution but before the case reached the Supreme Court. The amended statute only
bans those advertisements which are for illegal abortions to be performed within Virginia.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-71 to -76.1 (1975).
8. Bigelow was convicted and fined in the county court and in a de novo trial in the
circuit court of the county. Both courts set the fine at $500, of which $350 was suspended
"upon condition that he not further violate" the statute. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213
Va. 191, 192, 191 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1972).
9. Id.
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state criminal statutes prohibiting abortions within the first
trimester held unconstitutional).
11. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (statute requiring that abortions be conducted in hospitals, that
abortion decisions be made by a hospital committee with confirmation by other physi-
cians, and that the women seeking abortions be residents held unconstitutional).
12. 413 U.S. 909 (1973).
13. 214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). (Roe and Doe were found inapplicable since
"[n]either mentioned the subject of abortion advertising").
14. Id. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 418 U.S. 909 (1974), "in order
to review the important First Amendment issue presented." 421 U.S. 809, 815 (1975).
15. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
16. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (pamphlets circulated to
"encourage citizens to refuse to fight in World War I are not protected by first amendment).
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COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Specific forms of expression, libel, 17 obscenity 18 and "fighting
words,"' 19 have been denied the protection of the first amendment. At
one time it appeared certain that "commercial speech" was also within
this category of unprotected expression.
The "commercial speech" doctrine,20 established in Valentine v.
Chrestensen,21 apparently exempted "purely commercial advertising"
from first amendment protection. Unfortunately, the Chrestensen Court
gave little basis for distinguishing unprotected commercial speech from
protected "pure" speech. 22 The Court has since attempted to establish
17. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
18. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
19. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
20. In a series of cases referred to as the "Handbill Cases," Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938) and Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (a consolidation of four
state court cases), the Supreme Court first considered the limits of the police power to
restrict the distribution of handbills in light of first amendment guarantees and struck
down ordinances prohibiting street distribution of any handbill. Although the Court did
not assert that the amount of protection to be conferred depended on the content of the
speech, it does seem that the Court was influenced by the type of messages involved. In
the four Schneider cases, each appellant had been passing out handbills not for a purely
commercial motive, but for what has now come to be thought of as "protected speech,"
e.g., distributing the Jehovah Witness magazine The Watchtower, passing out bills to
announce political protest meetings (over the Spanish civil war and state unemployment
insurance), and leafletting to urge a boycott in a labor dispute. The Court held that the
anti-littering objective of the ordinances could be achieved by less burdensome restric-
tions. See generally Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: The First Amendment at a
Discount, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 60, 60-64 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, TheCommer-
cial Speech Doctrine].
21. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Chrestensen's request to exhibit a former Navy submarine for
profit at a city wharf was denied. He was also denied permission to distribute handbills
advertising his venture because of an anti-littering ordinance that applied only to "com-
mercial and business advertising matter." Id. at 53 n. 1. In a ruse to fall outside the statute's
proscription, he printed on both sides of the handbill; on one side was the original
advertisement, and on the other was a political statement-protesting the city's denial of
the use of the wharf. The district court relied on Lovelland Schneider, seenote 20 supra, to
enjoin the police commissioner from interfering with distribution of the handbill. The
ordinance was struck down for making a distinction that had no basis in fact, commercial
handbills cause litter but other handbills do not. The United States Court of Appeals
affirmed. 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941). The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. 316 U.S.
52 (1942). The rule was stated:
This Court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise
of the freedom of communicating information. . . and that, though the states...
may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly
burden. . . its employment.. . . We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.
Id. at 54. This holding has since been disparaged by one who was a member of the Court at
the time. "The ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection."
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
22. For various theories to explain the commercial speech exception see Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 949 n.93 (1963)
1976]
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guidelines for determining the point at which advocacy becomes adver-
tising. One consideration has been whether the speaker seeks financial
gain.23 This distinction, however, is not totally satisfactory. 24 The Court
(commercial speech relates to "property rights rather than free expression"); Develop-
ments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 H~Av. L. REV. 1005, 1027-28 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising]; 48 TUL. L. REV.
426, 429-31 (1974).
23. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), involving a challenge to an
ordinance prohibiting door-to-door commercial solicitation by a company in the business
of soliciting magazine subscriptions. Although Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943), held a similar prohibition invalid as applied to religious solicitors who distributed
free materials, the Breard court found that "selling . . . brings into the transaction a
commercial feature." 341 U.S. at 642. The Court found this commercial element to be the
main distinguishing feature between Martin and Breard, id. at 643, and upheld the
ordinance. Accord, Associated Students for the Univ. of Cal. at Riverside v. Attorney
General, 368 F. Supp. 11, 24 (D.C. Cal. 1973) (mailing pamphlets on birth control and
abortion procedures held not to be advertising because "[p]laintiffs have no financial
stake in the distribution. . . [since] the mailing was free"). The federal "blockbusting"
statute, which is to prevent realtors from inducing persons to sell or rent their homes by
alleging that "persons of a particular race, color, religion, or national origin" are about to
move into the neighborhood, specifically applies only to such representations which are
made "[f]or profit." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e). See also United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp.
1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969).
In some cases financial gain has not been considered significant. See Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105; 111 (1943) overruling Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942)
("the mere fact that the religious literature is 'sold' . . . rather than 'donated' does not
transform evangelism into a commercial enterprise"); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417
(1943) (state can not forbid the distribution of handbills which are admittedly intended to
raise funds for religious purposes). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964) (Court rejected the argument that payment for the allegedly libelous
advertisement placed it within the realm of unprotected commercial speech); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (the fact that "books, newspapers,
and magazines are published and sold for a profit does not prevent them from being a form
of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment").
24. Many commentators have expressed the opinion that the profit motive should not
be a consideration at all, arguing that a consumer's need for informed decisions in the
economic marketplace is just as important as informed decisions in the political process,
and that the goals of those who advertise are of no less social value than the goals of those
who espouse a cause. See Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1971); Gardner, Free Speech
in Public Places, 36 B.U.L. REV. 239, 240 (1956); Goss, The First Amendment's Weakest
Link: Government Regulation of ControversialAdvertising, 60 WOMEN LAW. J. 112 (1974);
Messerman, Abortion Counselling: Shall Women Be Permitted to Know?, 23 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 810, 822 (1973); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commer-
cial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 437-38 (1971);
Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 22; Comment, The Right to
Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63
GEO. L.J. 775, 801-802 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment The Right to Receive];
Comment, The First Amendment and Consumer Proection: Commercial Advertising as
Protected Speech, 50 ORE. L. REV. 177, 196 (1971); 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1000, 1004
(1974); 5 U. CH. L. REV. 675 (1938) (arguing against a commercial speech distinction
before Chrestensen). But see Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 524 (2d Cir. 1941)
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has also used a "motive" or "primary purpose" test, examining the
motive of the advertiser to determine whether the primary purpose of
the advertisement is to achieve economic gain or to disseminate con-
stitutionally protected information or opinion.25 Lower courts have
applied this test,26 but both commercial and informational elements are
often present and mutually dependent. 27 In these cases, the courts have
exercised broad discretion in their inquiry into motive,2 appearing to be
very result-oriented. 29 Commercial speech has thus been subject to
divergent treatment by the courts. 30
(Frank, J., dissenting) ("Thomas Paine, John Milton and Thomas Jefferson were not
fighting for the right to peddle commercial advertising"); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) ("Constitutional protection
should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political"); Meiklejohn, Public Speech
and the First Amendment, 55 Gao. L.J. 234, 262 (1966) ("to exert a claim upon our
constitutional protections, a social undertaking must become identified with a political
undertaking"); Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. REV.
1191, 1195 (1965) (since commercial advertising is not discussed or rebutted, it "results to
a lesser degree in a conscious choice among differing views").
25. The "motive test" is derived from Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
See note 21 supra. Chrestensen's handbill advertised primarily a commercial enterprise;
the political statement was appended just to evade the ordinance. The "motive test"
explains the anomalous results reached in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) and
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). See note 23 supra.
26. See Hodges v. Fifle, 332 F. Supp. 504,509 (D. Neb. 1971) (topless dancing in bars
held to be a "purely commercial advertisement" because it is used "not to disseminate
opinion or communicate information, but to sell a product or service"). See also United
States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972).
27. The word "advertorial" has become popular in describing advertisements which
combine commercial and informational elements. See Devore & Nelson, Commercial
Speech and PaidAccess to the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 745,747 (1975); 85 HARv. L. REV.
689, 692 (1972). See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,266 (1964) (a
paid advertisement in the New York Times which expressed concerned citizens' anger
over police action in a civil rights strife was distinguished from Chrestensen because "[i]t
communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed
abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and
objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern").
28. Compare Rockville Reminder, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 480 F.2d 4 (2d
Cir. 1973) (advertising circular also containing community news was found to be unpro-
tected commercial speech) with United Interchange, Inc. v. Harding, 154 Me. 128, 145
A.2d 94 (1958) (real estate periodicals which contained some news and commentary but
primarily advertising were held entitled to first amendment protection).
29. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd,
405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (statute banning all cigarette advertising from electronic media no
violation of broadcasters' first amendment rights).
30. Some courts hold that commercial speech is entitled to no first amendment
protection. See, e.g., Carpets by Carload, Inc. v. Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wis.
1973); Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Wis. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 497 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1974); Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235,411 P.2d 289,49
Cal. Rptr. 537, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966). See generally 23 DE PAUL L. REv. 1258,
1263-64 n.31-32 (1974). Other courts have given commercial speech full protection. See,
1976]
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In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rela-
tions,31 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the commercial
speech quagmire but did not do so. The Court affirmed the city commis-
sion's injunction prohibiting a newspaper from listing jobs in sex-
designated columns. 32 It acknowledged that "speech" is not rendered
commercial by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement 33 but
asserted that the advertisements in question were "classic examples of
commercial speech" 34 because they did not express an opinion or
assume a political posture; they were "no more than a proposal of
possible employment.1 35 It is unclear, however, whether the Court
denied the newspaper the right to print the advertisements in sex-
designated columns because the advertisements were commercial
speech or because discriminatory advertising had been outlawed. 36 It
was hoped that the Court's equivocation in Pittsburgh Press regarding
e.g., United States v. Pellegrino, 467 F.2d 41, 45 (9th Cir. 1972) ("We cannot agree...
that advertising. . . is less deserving of first amendment protection than the substance of
that which is advertised."); People v. Orser, 31 Cal. App. 3d 528,107 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1973).
Some courts have refused to decide what protection should be accorded commercial
speech even though they have had an opportunity to do so. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 n.12 (1971). See also Comment, The Right to Receive,
supra note 24, at 798 n.141. Most often courts find commercial speech to be "less
protected," but do not establish guidelines for deciding when speech is commercial. See,
e.g., Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), aff 'g324 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 934 (1972); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133,136 (9th Cir.
1971); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Capital Broadcasting v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972); Pent-R-Books, Inc., v. United States Postal
Serv., 328 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); New York Times Co. v. City of New York
Comm'n on Human Rights, 76 Misc. 2d 17,349 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1973). But seeFur
Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 16, 22
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court established guidelines reasoning that even though advertising is
less vigorously protected, the limitations on it "must be drawn narrowly, so as to meet the
perceived evil, without unnecessary impingement on the right of free speech").
31. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
32. Pittsburgh Press had listed jobs under column heads which read, "Jobs-Male
Interest" and "Jobs-Female Interest," in derogation of a city ordinance. Id. at 391.
33. Id. at 384.
34. Id. at 385.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 390. ("discrimination in unemployment is not only commercial activity, it is
illegal commercial activity"). See generally Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456,463 (4th Cir.
1973) ("freedom of the press furnishes no shield for discrimination in advertising");
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972)
(newspaper publisher's first amendment rights not violated by prohibition against rental
advertisements expressing a racial preference); Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of
Chicago, 36 Ill. 2d 530, 552-53, 224 N.E.2d 793, 807 (1967) ("Where speech is an integral
part of unlawful conduct, it has no constitutional protection.").
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the commercial speech doctrine meant that the time was ripe for a
definitive statement and that the Court would either establish the
boundaries of the doctrine or abrogate it altogether, at the next oppor-
tunity .3 The next opportunity appeared with Bigelow v. Virginia.38
Courts have struck down laws prohibiting abortion advertising under
various rationales. One approach permits certain abortion advertise-
ments by finding them to be informational and not commercial. 39 A
second approach allows abortion advertising by declaring that commer-
cial speech is as protected as any other form of expression.40 A third
approach ignores the commercial speech doctrine entirely, invalidating
the statute on other grounds.4' In Bigelow, however, the Virginia
Supreme Court rejected the first amendment arguments, and held that
the advertisement was unprotected commercial speech.42
The United States Supreme Court rejected "the central assumption
made by the Supreme Court of Virginia. . .that the First Amendment
guarantees of speech and the press are inapplicable to paid commercial
37. See Devore & Nelson, supra note 27, at 774 ("Before Pittsburgh Press there may
have been an element of false optimism among medialawyers. . . that the Supreme Court
was moving away from the commercial speech doctrine and would, if invited, eventually
overrule Chrestensen. That opportunity has now been presented and declined by the Court
in such a way as to invite resolution of many of the issues left unanswered by the lower
courts."); 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 1258, 1275 (1974); 8 U. RICHMOND L. REv. 292,293 (1974).
See also Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine, supra note 20, at 90; Comment, The
Right to Receive, supra note 24, at 799 n.143.
38. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
39. See Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d 719
(1962) (court distinguished abortion information from abortion advertising and found that
the statute prohibiting abortion and birth control device advertising did not apply to
informational pamphlets distributed by Planned Parenthood or other public interest
groups or by doctors to their patients). See also Mitchell Family Planning, Inc. v. City of
Royal Oak, 335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (billboard reading "Abortion Informa-
tion" and listing two New York telephone numbers disseminated information and thus did
not violate ordinance banning abortion advertising).
40. See Atlanta Cooperative News Project v. United States Postal Serv., 350 F. Supp.
234 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (a three-judge court declared 39 U.S.C. § 3001(a) (1970) (see note 6
supra) unconstitutional as a prior restraint); People v. Orser, 31 Cal. App. 3d 528,535, 107
Cal. Rptr. 458, 462 (1973) ("A person is as much entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment when the speech he utters or prints is for profit as when it is expressed
altruistically.").
41 See State v. New Times, Inc., 20 Ariz. App. 183,511 P.2d 196 (1973) (invalidating
state law prohibiting abortion advertisements based on Roe and Doe).
42. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972), aff'd on remand,
Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). The court rejected
Bigelow's argument that his advertisement was not covered by the statute because it was
informational rather than an encouragement to procure abortions, finding that the mention
of a fee made it commercial speech and within the Chrestensen rule, 213 Va. at 193, 191
S E.2d at 175. See 60 VA. L. REV. 154 (1974).
1976]
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advertisements. "43 The Court then undermined the commercial speech
doctrine by according Chrestensen a novel holding,4 criticizing the
commercial speech doctrine in a footnote,45 and stressing that the
holding in Pittsburgh Press was as much due to the illegality of the
advertised activity as its commerciality. 46 The Court did not, however,
abrogate the commercial speech doctrine entirely, but instead found
that this abortion advertisement was not commercial since it "did more
than simply propose a commercial transaction. . . .It contained fac-
tual material of 'clear public interest.' "47
The Court proposed a balancing test to handle future cases: "the
First Amendment interests at stake" are weighed against "the public
interest allegedly served by the regulation. '48 In Bigelow, the Court
weighed the state's interest in the quality of medical care provided
within its borders49 against appellant publisher's interest in freedom of
43. 421 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). The Court first found that the Virginia court had
erred in denying Bigelow standing to challenge the statute's overbreadth. Since Bigelow's
lower court conviction, however, the Virginia legislature had amended the statute, and the
amended statute only outlawed advertisements forillegal abortions performed in Virginia.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76.1 (1975). The issue of overbreadth had thus become moot; the
Court did not rest its decision on that issue.
44. The Court found that the holding of Chrestensen, that purely commercial advertis-
ing is not constitutionally protected speech, was "distinctly a limited one: the ordinance
was upheld as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising
could be distributed." 421 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 820 n.6, quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959)
(Douglas, J., concurring): "There is some doubt whether the 'commercial speech'
distinction announced in Valentine v. Chrestensen. . .retains continuing validity."
46. 421 U.S. at 821.
47. Id. at 822. The part of the advertisement which read "Abortions are now legal in
New York. There are no residency requirements." was referred to by the Court as being
informational. The Court also noted that the advertised activity pertained to constitutional
interests, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179(1973).
See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254(1964); Unemployed Workers Union v.
Hackett, 332 F. Supp. 1372 (D.R.I. 1971); United States v. Polak, 312 F. Supp. 112 (E.D.
Pa. 1970); Brown v. City of Albany, 108 Ga. App. 647, 134 S.E.2d 566 (1963).
The Court further held that Virginia could not regulate New York activities "merely
because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected when they travel to that
state," nor could Virginia "bar a citizen from another state from disseminating informa-
tion about an activity that is legal in that state." 421 U.S. at 824-825. Justice Rehnquist
dissented, arguing that the Court misplaced reliance on Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S.
657, 669 (1892), to support the proposition that Virginia could not regulate the advertiser,
since his activity was in New York. 421 U.S. at 834 n.2. Justice Rehnquist stated the
correct rule: if an act is done in State A which foreseeably has an impact or inflicts injury
in State B, then State B can regulate it, and sanction the actor. Id. at 836, citing Young v,
Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
48. 421 U.S. at 826. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
supra note 22, at 912.
49. 421 U.S. at 827. It seems the Court tips the scales by summarizing Virginia's
[Vol. 12:221
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speech and the press.50 The balance was in favor of freedom of speech
for the newspaper publisher.5 1 The Court felt that Virginia could not
legally prevent its citizens from using medical services outside the state
since Virginia did not claim that this advertisement affected the quality
of medical services within the state.
5 2
In spite of the expressed hopes of first amendment theorists,53 the
Supreme Court in Bigelow clearly stated that it was not delineating
the controvertible contours of the commercial speech doctrine.5 4 The
Court instead applied a balancing test, 55 claiming to treat advertis-
ing like all other types of public expression.56 The balancing test is not
interest in this way. Virginia could be said to have an interest in the medical care of any of
its citizens, whether the treatment is within or without its borders.
50. Id. at 828.
51. Id. at 829.
52. Id. at 827. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, dissented, finding this
advertisement to be "a classic commercial proposition" with only slight informational
content. Id. at 831. He stated that the Court has "always refused to distinguish for First
Amendment purposes on the basis of content," ld. at 831, and thus the fact that this
advertisement disseminated abortion information did not remove it from the realm of
unprotected commercial speech. Justice Rehnquist was also concerned with the majori-
ty's finding that Virginia's interest was insufficient to sustain the regulation. Advertising
in the medical health field has traditionally been regulated, id. at 832, citingNorth Dakota
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973) (advertising of
prescription drug prices prohibited); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 384 U.S. 483 (1955)
(advertising of the sales of eyeglasses and frames regulated); Semler v. Dental Exam'rs,
294 U.S. 608 (1935) (advertising for dental services regulated, stating the rule that states
are free to establish such strict regulations in this area as they deem necessary to preserve
high professional standards). Virginia's concern over the health of its citizens was far from
a hypothetical one in view of the unsavory reputations of abortion referral agencies. See
S.P.S. Consultants v. Lefkowitz, 333 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); State v. Abortion
Information Agency, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 825, 323 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. Ct. 1971); State v.
Mitchell, 66 Misc. 2d 514, 321 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
53. See note 37 supra.
54. "We need not decide here the extent to which constitutional protection is afforded
commercial advertising under all circumstances and in the face of all kinds of regulation."
421 U.S. at 826.
55. Id.
56. "Advertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation
that serves a legitimate public interest." Id. This statement, while elevating the status of
advertising, certainly denigrates other public expression. In the past, courts have required
much more than "reasonableness" to regulate first amendment rights. The government
interest must be extremely strong before speech can be regulated. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (government interest must be "compelling");
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958) (state interest must be
"substantial"); Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664, 671 (5th Cir. 1969) (public interest
must be "overwhelming"). See generally Kaufman, supra note 4, at 774-75. Not every
member of the Court is a proponent of the balancing test. Justice Stewart, dissenting in
Pittsburgh Press, railed against it: "So long as Members of this Court view the First
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new,57 even in the realm of commercial speech cases. 58 But a balancing
test does not help clarify the commercial speech doctrine since it does
not distinguish commercial from non-commercial speech.59
Recent cases demonstrate that judicial reliance upon the commercial
speech doctrine may produce totally irreconcilable results.60 The Court
did nothing to ameliorate this in Bigelow. Advertising in general is highly
regulated. 61 The constitutionality of such regulations, however, can be
assessed without reliance upon the traditional commercial speech doc-
trine. One suggestion is for the Court to articulate a commercial speech
doctrine coupled with a "right to receive.'"62 Another is to abandon the
Amendment as no more than a set of 'values' to be balanced against other 'values,' that
Amendment will remain in grave jeopardy." 413 U.S. at 402.
57. The first appearance of the balancing test in the Supreme Court is usually
attributed to Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See generally Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1425 (1962).
58. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (homeowners' right to privacy
deemed more important than salesman's right to solicit door to door); Hiett v. United
States, 415 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1969) (addressee's right to receive information on foreign
divorces .through the mail outweighs government interest in prevention of fraudulent
divorces); Lowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 306 F. Supp. 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
aff'd, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (postal regulations on unsolicited erotic materials upheld
because unwilling recipient's right of privacy is more important than plaintiff's right of
free speech).
59. Compare Population Serv. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(state law prohibiting advertisement of contraceptives and their sale to persons under
sixteen held unconstitutional because the state interest of discouraging sexual activity
among unmarried persons was not strong enough to outweigh minors' rights of privacy,
especially in the absence of evidence that teenage sexual activity was a variable dependent
on the availability of contraceptives) with Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa
County, 92 Ariz. 231, 357 P.2d 719 (1962) (state interest of decreasing sexual activity
among unmarried persons is sufficient to justify the ban against abortion advertising by all
except doctors and public interest groups).
60. See note 30 supra. Compare Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825
(W.D. Va. 1969) (statute prohibiting advertising of prescription drug prices does not
violate first amendment) with Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), affl'd, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976), (statute
prohibiting advertising of prescription drugs invalid as violation of consumers' first
amendment right to know). Compare also Linmark Associates v. Township of Willing-
boro, 535 F.2d 786, 794-96 (3d Cir. 1976), with Terminal-Hudson Electronics v. Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
61. See Note, The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1097-1111
(1956).
62. See Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1969) (federal statute prohibiting
use of mails for distributing material on foreign divorces unconstitutionally vague since
the right to be informed of available services was more important than the alleged
government interest in preventing fraudulent divorces). See also Comment, The Right to
Receive, supra note 24, at 803. If aright to receive is established, the burden should shift to
the government to show why communication should be restricted. "The right to receive
thus becomes not so much a theoretical bulwark in its own right, but rather a tool for
demonstrating the weakness of the commercial speech doctrine." Id. There may be
standing barriers to relief using "right to receive" theories. SeeAtlanta Cooperative News
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doctrine altogether and decide cases on a due process rationale. 63 The
reasons articulated for denying advertising any protection are unclear,
as some courts have acknowledged.6 It is difficult to justify the prohibi-
tion on advertising products or services which are not themselves
prohibited. 65 Thus the doctrine itself is an unnecessary legal tool.
Although Bigelow v. Virginia does not meet all the expectations of
commentators, 66 it provides some guidance for the future. State laws
against the advertising of abortions will probably be found unconstitu-
tional under Bigelow. Indeed, any statute prohibiting the advertisement
of a product or service which is illegal within the state, but legal in the
state from which the advertisement is sponsored, may be struck down.
Commercial advertising is no longer per se unprotected speech, but will
be accorded first amendment protection if it is found to contain factual
materials "of clear public interest." Courts may well use a balancing
test in the future to determine whether regulation of the advertising
should be upheld.
But Bigelow leaves many questions unanswered. It is not clear how
much protection is to be accorded commercial speech nor at what point
speech becomes commercial since all advertising has some informa-
tional content. 67 The problem with Bigelow v. Virginia is not its result,
Project v. United States Postal Serv., 350 F. Supp. 234 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (two newspaper
subscribers, who claimed a denial of their right to receive if the publisher was not allowed
to mail newspapers containing the forbidden advertisements, were dismissed as plaintiffs
because they were unable to establish the requisite nexus between their status and the
constitutional claim).
63. Resnick, Freedom of Speech and Commercial Solicitation, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 655,
661 (1942) (the validity of the ordinance as a regulatory measure should be determined
according to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as it defines the limits of
the police power of the state because the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech is artificial and difficult to apply as a practical matter).
64. See, e.g., Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20,24-25 (E.D. Wis. 1973)
("the rationale for the distinction is seldom made explicit, and the tests for distinguishing
between commercial and non-commercial expression would never survive evenhanded
application").
65. Prohibiting abortion advertisements might be a way for states to collaterally
prevent their citizens fromusing constitutionally permissible services. SeeLA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:87.4 (Supp. 1974) (statute enacted after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
prohibiting advertisements for abortions). See generally Messerman, Abortion Counsel-
ling: Shall Women Be Permitted to Know? 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 810 (1972).
66. See note 37 supra.
67. Since Bigelow the Supreme Court has again had an opportunity to resolve these
questions. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976), the Court invalidated a Virginia statute prohibiting pharmacists from
advertising prices of prescription drugs. Although the Court made general statements
which implied that the commercial speech doctrine had been abrogated, id. at 1825, it
carefully framed the ultimate issue: "Our question is whether speech which does 'no
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but that the Court did not avail itself of the opportunity to exert control
over an undisciplined legal theory. Until such a time comes, both
advertisers and consumers may suffer at the hands of this shabbily
treated "stepchild of the first amendment."
Sally H. Newton
more than propose a commercial transaction'.., lacks all protection, Our answer is that
it [does] not." Id. at 1826. The Court went on to acknowledge that "some forms of
commercial speech regulation are surely permissible." Id. at 1830. The Court's opinion in
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacyadds little to its Bigelow decision. Bigelow established that
commercial speech is not wholly outside the protection of the first amendment.
68. Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 22, at 1027 ("no
court has undertaken to explain why commercial advertising does not deserve the title
'speech' which ennobles and protects political, social, and religious advocacy").
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